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This experiment (N = 68 dyads) tested the infl uence of experience and advice on behavior 
and joint outcomes in integrative two-party negotiations. Dyads in an advice condition received 
short tactical advice to question fi xed-pie assumptions and to exchange information. Afterward, 
they negotiated once. Dyads in an experience condition negotiated twice in successive rounds. 
Finally, dyads in an experience-and-advice condition negotiated twice and received advice 
prior to the second negotiation. Dependent measures were negotiation behavior, negotiation 
duration, joint outcome, and judgmental accuracy. Results showed that the combination 
of advice and experience led dyads to apply more problem solving and fewer contentious 
strategies, which mediated the higher joint outcomes that these dyads reached in shorter times. 
Experience or advice alone was not suffi cient to make negotiators use different strategies or to 
exploit the integrative potential of the negotiations better than they did before they received 
advice and/or gained experience.
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In international diplomacy, in business, 
and sometimes even in intimate relationships, 
negotiation skills are the key to success. How 
negotiation skills affect success in these various 
domains has been a long-standing interest dating 
back to the works of Niccolo Machiavelli and 
Francois de Callières (e.g. Berridge, Keens-Soper, &
Otte, 2001). Nowadays, training and advice in 
negotiation is a million dollar business, with 
many writers offering best-selling books about 
negotiation (e.g. Fisher & Ury, 1981; Ury, 1992) 
and many consulting fi rms offering courses in 
negotiation skills. 
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Whereas scholars like Francois de Callières 
were concerned primarily with ways to increase 
a negotiator’s personal success, contemporary 
negotiation research and training recognizes 
that negotiator success is best defined in 
terms of the collective functionality of agreements 
(Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000). 
Fisher and Ury’s (1981) classic example of two 
sisters quarreling about an orange best illus-
trates this position: once the sisters decided 
to halve the orange, one squeezed her part to 
drink the juice, while the other used the peel 
from her part in a cake. Both sisters would have 
been better off if the fi rst one had taken all 
the juice and the second one all the peel. Because 
most negotiations allow for such integrative 
agreements (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982), why do 
negotiators persistently perceive negotiations 
as purely distributive (the so-called ‘fi xed-pie 
perception’, Bazerman & Neale, 1983)? Why do 
they so often fail to realize the integrative poten-
tial that can benefi t everyone? This issue be-
comes all the more important once we realize 
that reaching integrative agreements fosters 
economic prosperity, strengthens feelings of self-
effi cacy, increases satisfaction, and reduces the 
likelihood of future confl ict (De Dreu, Weingart, 
& Kwon, 2000; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994).
Research probing the reasons for negotiators’ 
failure to reach integrative agreements has fo-
cused on structural and motivational variables 
(De Dreu, Weingart et al., 2000; Druckman, 
1994; Pruitt, 1981), on such cognitive barriers 
as memory defi cits and erroneous reasoning 
(Bazerman & Neale, 1983), and more recently 
on motivated information processing (De Dreu & 
Carnevale, 2003; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 
2000). Although such research has enhanced 
our knowledge of the barriers to constructive 
negotiations, it offers little advice about how to 
overcome these barriers. From a practitioner’s 
point of view, a critical question is whether 
someone can actually learn to negotiate better, 
and whether such learning simply requires 
experience with many negotiations. Or maybe 
experience is not the critical issue, and becoming 
a successful negotiator requires the right advice 
instead. After all, research shows that expertise in 
a particular content domain does not necessarily 
derive from simply doing the same task over and 
over again (Sonnentag, 1998). 
The question addressed in our research is 
whether experience, advice, or a combination 
of the two improves negotiation performance. 
We first review the literature on advice in 
decision making and a few empirical studies 
on the role of experience and advice in nego-
tiator success. Unfortunately, the results of 
these studies are somewhat contradictory, and 
researchers have focused more on the outcomes 
of negotiation rather than the underlying 
behavioral processes. To fi ll this void, we re-
port a face-to-face negotiation experiment in 
which specifi c hypotheses are tested about the 
(combined) infl uence of experience and advice 
not only on negotiation outcomes, but also on 
the underlying behavioral processes. 
Effects of advice 
Research on the use of advice in decision making 
(e.g. Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & 
Kleinberger, 2000) suggests that people have a 
general tendency to egocentrically discount the 
advice they receive. Yaniv and Kleinberger, for 
example, asked their participants to make initial 
estimates of the years in which historical events 
took place. Participants then received advice 
in the form of other participants’ estimates. 
Participants did combine their initial estimates 
with the advice they received, but gave fi nal 
estimates that were much closer to their own 
initial estimates than to the other participant’s 
estimates. This occurred even when the other 
participants were viewed as experts on the task. 
Yaniv and Kleinberger argued that decision 
makers discount an advisor’s opinion because 
they are privy to the reasons supporting their 
own estimate, but not to the reasons supporting 
the advisor’s estimates. Further evidence for 
the tendency to discount advice has also been 
reported (see Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Harvey, 
Harries, & Fischer, 2000; Lim & O’Connor, 
1995). 
Fixed-pie perceptions are common at the onset 
of many negotiations, and revising these percep-
tions is related to more successful negotiation 
(Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Thompson, 1991; 
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Thompson & Hastie, 1990). One goal of our 
research was therefore to uncover whether and 
when giving negotiators advice can attenuate 
such perceptions, or whether negotiators always 
discount such advice. Some researchers have 
found that giving negotiators advice and cues 
challenging fi xed-pie perceptions infl uences 
their performance (e.g. Weingart, Hyder, & 
Prietula, 1996). For example, Kemp and Smith 
(1994) informed negotiators that their own 
priorities might differ from those of their 
counterparts. This led to higher joint outcomes, 
compared to a control condition in which nego-
tiators were not given this information about 
priorities (see also Thompson, 1991). However, 
several researchers have found that negotiators 
discounted similar advice and hardly revised their 
fi xed-pie perceptions. For example, De Dreu, 
Koole et al. (2000) gave students information 
about an upcoming negotiation that included 
their own, but not their opponents’ payoff 
schedules. The students’ fi xed-pie perceptions 
were then assessed. Later, the students received 
advice in the form of full information about 
their opponents’ payoff schedules. After a short 
fi ller task, fi xed-pie perceptions were measured 
again, and this time were weaker. This suggests 
that participants used the advice they received. 
Yet close inspection of the results reveals that 
even after receiving full information about their 
opponents’ payoff schedules, participants rarely 
abandoned their initial erroneous perceptions. 
Similarly, Thompson and DeHarpport (1994) 
reported that in their research ‘even some nego-
tiators who were provided with full feedback 
about the other person’s interests failed to 
report ... that their opponent had different 
priorities’ (p. 341).
More evidence that instruction-based advice 
may not change fi xed-pie perceptions comes 
from a study by Van Boven and Thompson 
(2003). They compared the mental models and 
trade-off insights reported by students with no 
prior expertise after engaging in three different 
tasks. In the standard negotiation condition, 
two students played the role of brokers and 
conducted a commodity negotiation that had 
integrative potential—one party could profi t 
more from trading rice and the other party 
could profi t more from trading wheat. In the 
didactic training condition, participants read 
the same negotiation instructions, but instead 
of actually negotiating, they were given advice 
about negotiating. This advice consisted of a 
written analysis of how both parties could reach 
the maximum joint gain. Finally, participants in 
the experiential training condition began the 
negotiation like participants in the standard 
negotiation condition, but were interrupted after 
fi ve minutes. At that point, they received the 
same advice as in the didactic training condition, 
and discussed this with their opponent. The 
researchers assessed all participants’ trade-off 
insights by asking what their perceptions of their 
opponents’ payoffs were. Participants also rated 
the relatedness of all combinations of 15 terms 
related to the negotiation (e.g. rice, wheat, 
exchange information, compromise, etc.). These 
relatedness judgments were used to compute 
graphical representations of the participants’ 
mental models. Participants in the didactic 
training condition (advice only) showed the 
fewest trade-off insights and had mental models 
similar to those of participants who negotiated, 
but failed to reach integrative agreements. So 
although advice alone did not help to develop 
trade-off insights, participants in the experiential 
training condition who gained negotiation 
experience before receiving advice (experience 
and advice) developed the best trade-off insights 
of all and had mental models similar to those of 
participants who fully realized the integrative 
potential of the negotiation. That is, advice led 
to more accurate perceptions when preceded by 
a real negotiation experience. We will come back 
to this fi nding when discussing the combined 
effects of experience and advice. 
Effects of experience
These and other studies suggest that advice may 
be insuffi cient to improve negotiation skills. Few 
people would agree that people become good 
negotiators simply by reading negotiation 
textbooks. Yet many people would agree that 
‘practice makes perfect’ where negotiation skills 
are concerned. Skilled negotiators often have an 
extensive track record, and it seems unlikely that 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(4)
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negotiation skills are innate. Several experiments 
have investigated the development of outcomes 
that non-expert negotiators achieve in succes-
sive negotiations with integrative potential. In 
some studies, joint outcomes improved both 
over negotiation rounds and within negotiators 
(Thompson, 1990a, 1990b, 1991). Thompson 
and DeHarpport (1994), however, found no 
effects of experience when negotiators engaged 
in different tasks over time. They only observed 
an effect of experience when negotiators were 
provided with feedback on their performance 
after each round. All in all, there is thus mixed 
support for ‘learning by doing’ when it comes 
to negotiation. 
Research in cognitive and educational psych-
ology has shown that people recall superfi cial 
similarities more easily than structural ones. 
This led Gentner, Loewenstein, and Thompson 
(2003) to conclude that ‘our ability to take 
advantage of our prior experiences is limited’ 
(p. 93). During repeated negotiations, people 
could discover either superfi cial or structural 
similarities among the negotiations. Negotiation 
experience that is based on the discovery of 
superfi cial similarities (e.g. the kind of goods 
that are traded) is of little use for becoming a 
better negotiator. To achieve that goal, people 
must learn negotiation principles, such as the use 
of integrative potential through the formation 
of contingency contracts or through logrolling 
(the mutually benefi cial exchange of concessions 
on issues of different priorities). To learn these 
principles, Gentner and her colleagues argued, 
people must discover structural rather than 
superfi cial similarities between negotiations. 
Gaining such expertise is seldom accomplished 
by simply negotiating repeatedly. 
Experience and advice in negotiation 
Several studies indicate that expertise in nego-
tiation is best achieved through experience 
and advice. Gentner et al. (2003), for example, 
demonstrated the effectiveness of negotiation 
training based on analogical encoding in a 
series of experiments. In their research, novice 
bargainers had to read two cases describing 
successful negotiations. In a guided-analogy 
training condition, participants were advised 
to compare these two cases and fi nd the under-
lying structure common to both cases (which 
was either the implementation of a contingency 
contract or the discovery of mutually benefi cial 
trade-offs). In other conditions, participants 
read the cases separately or received no training 
at all. The results showed that when partici-
pants found the underlying principle through 
analogical encoding, they could transfer it 
to a subsequent negotiation. Guided-analogy 
training in combination with some kind of 
experience (reading about two negotiation cases) 
therefore increased subsequent negotiation 
performance.
Similar evidence for the benefi ts of experience 
and training was found by Nadler, Thompson and 
Van Boven (2003). In a study of different types 
of learning, dyads negotiated an employment 
contract and their outcomes were assessed. 
Then they received either analogical training 
(two short vignettes describing negotiations 
in which trade-offs were made), or engaged in 
observational training (watching a videotape 
of a negotiation like the one they had just 
fi nished, in which the bargainers reached a 
fully integrative agreement). A control group 
received no training at all. Afterwards, the same 
dyads engaged in a second, different negotiation. 
Nadler et al. found no signifi cant improvement in 
the control group. This suggests that experience 
alone may be insuffi cient to improve negotiation 
performance. Performance was improved, 
however, for dyads that received observational or 
analogical training between the two negotiations. 
They reached higher joint outcomes and 
made more profi table trade-offs in the second 
negotiation than did dyads that received no 
such training. 
Finally, the research by Van Boven and 
Thompson (2003) described earlier also 
demonstrated the benefi ts of a combination 
of experience and training. Remember that in 
that research, advice did not help negotiators to 
develop trade-off insights, unless the negotiators 
had gained some experience before they received 
the advice. 
There are at least two reasons why combining 
experience and advice might improve negotiation 
performance beyond the benefits of either 
advice or experience alone. First, bargainers 
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can compare the advice they receive with their 
own experience from earlier negotiations. This 
would help them to transfer the advice and 
adjust their negotiation behavior, which in turn 
should improve their performance. Second, 
people (especially those with little negotiation 
experience) tend to view negotiations as a 
game that one either wins or loses. This results in 
fi xed-pie perceptions and a generally competitive 
approach, which makes integrative agreements 
unlikely (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). But after 
experiencing a negotiation, negotiators should 
be more motivated to follow advice. Accordingly, 
we predict that a combination of experience and 
advice leads to better negotiation outcomes than 
experience or advice alone (Hypothesis 1). 
As mentioned earlier, research on negoti-
ation experience has focused on the outcomes 
of negotiations, rather than on negotiation 
behaviors. As a result, we know little about the 
underlying processes that might account for the 
effects of experience (and advice). A second goal 
of our research was thus to explore the behavioral 
processes triggered by experience and advice that 
might lead to improved negotiation. Negotiation 
research (e.g. Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Kimmel, 
Pruitt, Magenau, & Carnevale, 1980) has demon-
strated that joint outcomes are related to three 
types of negotiation tactics: distributive behavior, 
information exchange, and heuristic trial and 
error. The aim of distributive behavior is to force 
opponents to make concessions. This usually 
leads to poorer joint outcomes (Pruitt & Lewis, 
1975). Information exchange and heuristic 
trial and error are strategies that help people 
to identify mutually satisfying settlements. Both 
strategies have been shown to increase the 
likelihood of reaching integrative agreements 
and high joint outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart 
et al., 2000). Past research on experience (and 
advice) in negotiation has not revealed whether 
their effects on joint outcomes are due to:
(a) less distributive behavior; (b) more infor-
mation exchange; (c) more heuristic trial and 
error; or (d) any combination of these tactics. 
We hope to resolve this issue.
Non-expert negotiators seldom engage in infor-
mation exchange, displaying lots of distributive 
behavior and heuristic trial and error instead 
(Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilheimer, 1981; Pruitt & 
Lewis, 1975). Weingart et al. (1996) found that 
showing such negotiators descriptions of inte-
grative as well as distributive tactics increased the 
tendency to exchange information, but did not 
affect distributive behavior. This suggests that 
contentious (distributive) behavior is the ‘default’ 
option at first, and that learning (through 
experience and/or advice) helps negotiators to 
engage in problem solving behavior (heuristic 
trial and error or information exchange). 
Accordingly, we predicted that the combination 
of experience and advice would lead negotiators 
to engage in more problem solving (Hypothesis 2). 
As additional research questions, we explored 
whether negotiators engage in less contentious 
behavior as they gain experience, and whether 
they make more accurate judgments about each 
other’s interests.
Method
Participants and experimental design
Participants were 140 students (aged between 
18 and 35 years, Md = 22) from the Friedrich-
Alexander University in Erlangen. They were 
asked to sign up for a project in which people’s 
negotiation behavior would be audiotaped 
and analyzed by a psychology undergraduate 
student, but they were given no further details 
about the research. As an incentive, cash prizes 
(three prizes of DM100, and two prizes of DM50, 
approximately US$50 and US$25, respectively) 
for the five best-performing participants 
were promised. Two students of the same sex 
were scheduled for each session. Dyads were 
randomly assigned to one of three experimental 
conditions (experience and advice vs. advice 
only vs. experience only). Two dyads did not 
complete the experiment and so their data were 
not included in the analyses, leaving a sample 
of 34 female and 34 male dyads. 
Materials
Two negotiation tasks were used in random order. 
One concerned a negotiation between union and 
management representatives, who were required 
to reach agreement on four issues—salary, 
medical coverage, starting date, and contract 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(4)
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duration. The other task concerned the sale 
of an old building. In this task, agreement had 
to be reached about the price, renovation, 
monthly rate of payment, and moving in date. 
Table 1, which displays the payoff schedules 
used in both negotiations, shows that priorities 
among these issues differed. For example, in 
the union–management negotiation, the full 
integrative potential was realized by settling 
on a high salary (Level 5 on Issue 1) and low 
medical coverage (Level 1 on Issue 3). In both 
tasks, fully integrative agreements provided 
both parties with 4000 points, whereas a 50-50 
compromise yielded only 2800 points (for a full 
discussion, see Thompson, 1991). The payoff 
schedules in the two negotiations differed with 
respect to the position (fi rst or third column) 
of the highest priority issue. This ensured that 
the payoff schedule participants received in the 
second round was not identical to the one from 
the fi rst round.
The advice consisted of three tips, labeled ‘The 
Three Golden Hints for Successful Negotiation’. 
These were: 
(1) Don’t see the negotiation as “What the other 
person gets is what I lose”, but try to reach the best 
outcome for both of you; (2) Ask your partner which 
item is most important to him or her; (3) Inform your 
partner which item is most important to you.
Depending on the experimental condition, 
participants received a sheet of paper that 
contained these tips either before or after 
their fi rst negotiation (in the advice-only or 
experience-and-advice conditions, respectively, 
see below). To make sure that participants read 
the advice carefully, they were asked whether 
they considered the hints useful (coded as 0 
not useful at all; 3 very useful ) and whether they 
intended to act on them (0 no intention; 3 strong 
intention).
Procedure and dependent measures 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, the members 
of each dyad were seated at a table opposite 
each other. Participants were randomly assigned 
the roles of buyer and seller, or union and 
management, respectively. They received a 
lottery ticket as an award for participation, 
some written negotiation instructions, and a 
payoff schedule. Participants knew their own 
points, but were not informed about the points 
of their opponent. They were instructed to 
Table 1. Payoff schedules 
Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4
Payoff schedule for Party A
Level 1 (1600) Level 1 (0) Level 1 (4000) Level 1 (2400)
Level 2 (1200) Level 2 (–600) Level 2 (3000) Level 2 (1800)
Level 3 (800) Level 3 (–1200) Level 3 (2000) Level 3 (1200)
Level 4 (400) Level 4 (–1800) Level 4 (1000) Level 4 (600)
Level 5 (0) Level 5 (–2400) Level 5 (0) Level 5 (0)
Payoff schedule for Party B
Level 1 (0) Level 1 (–2400) Level 1 (0) Level 1 (0)
Level 2 (1000) Level 2 (–1800) Level 2 (400) Level 2 (600)
Level 3 (2000) Level 3 (–1200) Level 3 (800) Level 3 (1200)
Level 4 (3000) Level 4 (–600) Level 4 (1200) Level 4 (1800)
Level 5 (4000) Level 5 (0) Level 5 (1600) Level 5 (2400)
Note: Instead of Party A, Party B, and Issues 1 to 4, the following labels were used: Management, labor union, salary, 
starting date, medical coverage, and duration in the collective bargaining task, and seller, buyer, price, renovation, monthly 
rate, and moving in date in the castle sale task, respectively. The fi ve levels within each issue either had labels with 
high face value, such as 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, etc., or abstract labels such as 
A, B, C, D, E. Participants were assigned the role of Party A in one negotiation and of Party B in the other. They 
were told that the numbers in parentheses were the points they would earn. Each task contained two purely 
distributive issues (2 and 4) and two issues that could be logrolled to maximize joint outcome (1 and 3). 
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reach an agreement on all four issues within 
15 minutes. The experimenter announced when 
14 minutes had passed.1 Communication was 
unrestricted, except that participants could not 
physically exchange their payoff schedules. All 
participants agreed to have their negotiations 
tape-recorded.
Dyads in the experience-only condition negotiated 
twice. As an unrelated fi ller task, inbetween those 
negotiations, participants received four matrices 
containing the numbers from 1 to 90 and were 
asked to draw a line starting by the number 1 and 
connecting as many numbers as possible within 
30 seconds. This task was selected because it was 
easy to administer and kept participants busy for 
about the same amount of time that participants 
in the experience-and-advice conditions spent on 
their advice instructions. Dyads in the advice-only 
condition received the advice prior to their fi rst 
(and only) negotiation. Dyads in the experience-
and-advice condition received the advice after 
completing their fi rst negotiation, and then 
they engaged in a second negotiation. 
After every negotiation, participants wrote 
down the agreement on their payoff schedules, 
but did not discuss with their opponents the 
number of points they had earned.2 After 
their last negotiation, participants completed 
a questionnaire assessing their perceptions of 
their opponents’ preferences (see below). As in 
previous research (e.g. Thompson, 1990b, 1991), 
participants were shown a payoff schedule that 
displayed blanks instead of points. Then they 
were asked to put numbers into the blanks to 
indicate what they thought their counterpart’s 
payoff schedule looked like. Participants further 
provided some demographic data. Finally, they 
were thanked for their participation. Once they 
were debriefed, participants were told that 
because different experimental conditions could 
lead to different performances, everyone would 
actually have an equal chance to win a prize. 
About three weeks after the experiment, fi ve 
winners were randomly selected and awarded 
a prize. 
Joint outcome was calculated by adding the 
points that both dyad members earned on 
all four issues in one negotiation. The lowest 
possible score was 3,200. The more negotiators 
integrated their interests, the closer their score 
came to 8,000.
Duration was the time negotiators needed 
to reach agreement; impasses were assigned a 
duration of 15 minutes.
Negotiation behavior  was assessed from 
the transcriptions of the tape recordings. 
Speaking turns were categorized using a coding 
system used by several other researchers (e.g. 
De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Harinck, 
De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000; Pruitt & Lewis, 
1975). The codes we used are listed in Table 2. 
Each speaking turn was assigned one or more 
codes, depending on the content of the speaking 
unit. Each code could be assigned only one 
time to each speaking unit. If, for example, 
one negotiator asked for an offer and uttered 
two warnings, before the other negotiator 
interrupted, then the speaking term would get 
one code for asking for an offer and one code 
for threat or warning. Two raters independently 
coded 29 randomly chosen negotiations (one 
out of four). An overall agreement of 88.0% 
showed that the coding reliability was high.3 
Disagreements were resolved through discussion 
between the coders. Only one person coded 
the remaining 87 negotiations. Because later 
analyses were performed at the dyadic level, we 
counted the frequency of each code for each 
negotiation (rather than for each negotiator). 
To control for the different lengths of the 
negotiations (between 5 and 57 speaking turns), 
we calculated relative frequencies for each code 
by dividing its absolute frequency by the number 
of speaking turns. We then logit transformed 
these relative frequency scores to normalize 
their distributions (Cohen, Cohen, West, & 
Aiken, 2003). Analyses with non-transformed 
scores yielded the same results. 
We submitted the logit transformed frequency 
scores for the negotiation behaviors to an ex-
ploratory principal component analysis (with 
varimax rotation) to investigate whether broader 
negotiation strategies might have produced the 
specifi c negotiation behaviors. We found two 
strong factors, with eigenvalues of 4.97 and 2.76, 
that seemed to refl ect traditional descriptions 
of negotiation behavior (e.g. Lewicki, Barry, 
Saunders, & Minton, 2003).4 The fi rst factor 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(4)
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was labeled ‘contentious behaviors’, because the 
following behaviors loaded strongly (> .40) on 
that factor: rejecting an offer, repeating an offer, 
commitment to a certain position, persuasive 
arguments, unfriendly remarks, and threats 
and warnings. All of these are traditionally asso-
ciated with distributive bargaining (Lewicki et al., 
2003). We calculated a composite contending 
score (α = .75) by averaging the logit transformed 
frequencies for these behaviors and multiply-
ing the result by 100. The second factor was 
labeled ‘problem solving behavior’, because 
the following behaviors loaded strongly (> .40) 
on it: making cooperative statements, inquiring 
about the other’s points or priorities, providing 
information about one’s own points or priorities, 
and showing insight into, and understanding of 
the other’s priorities. All of these are tradition-
ally associated with integrative bargaining 
(Lewicki et al., 2003). We calculated a composite 
problem solving score (α = .76) by averaging the 
logit transformed frequencies for these behaviors 
and multiplying the result by 100. 
We used the participants’ perceptions of 
their opponents’ payoff schedules to calculate 
judgmental accuracy scores. These scores were 
based on the deviations between negotiator’s 
estimates and the true values for the two logrol-
ling issues. They were transformed to range 
between 0 (fi xed-pie perception) and 1 (perfect 
accuracy). Imagine, for example, that a buyer in 
the castle negotiation estimated that the seller 
would earn 3600 points more on price Level 1 
than on price Level 5. Furthermore, this buyer 
estimated that for the monthly rate, the seller 
could earn 2000 points more on Level 1 than 
on Level 5. This hypothetical buyer had a cor-
rect understanding of the opposed interests 
within each issue—remember that the buyer 
earned more on Level 5 than on Level 1. Yet, 
this buyer had a pretty strong fi xed-pie bias, 
refl ecting little understanding of the different 
priorities between parties. The buyer assumed 
that his or her most valuable issue, price, was 
very important to the seller as well. Yet this as-
sumption was inaccurate—remember that for 
the buyer there were 4000 points at stake on the 
issue of price. For the seller, the stakes on the 
issue of price were actually much lower, namely 
1600 points. Similarly, the buyer in this example 
underestimated the true importance of monthly 
rate to the seller. The buyer would have earned 
an accuracy score of [(4000 – 3600)/(4000 – 
1600) + (1600 – 2000)/(1600 – 4000)]/2 = 0.33. 
Accuracy indices were not computed for 12 
participants who fi lled in the blanks as if both 
negotiators would earn the most points on the 
same level. Accuracy scores were signifi cantly 
correlated within dyads (intraclass correlation 
of r = .31, p < .05). Even though averaging 
accuracy scores within dyads produced similar 
results in later analyses, we chose to assign each 
dyad the score of its most accurate member. Our 
rationale for this was that discovering integrative 
potential in a negotiation is a disjunctive task. 
One negotiator with an accurate understanding 
of the situation is enough to produce benefi ts 
for both persons. 
Table 2. Coding system
Codes assigned per speaking unit
Information exchange
 1. Asking the other for an offer or a suggestion or a 
reaction to an offer 
 2. Inquiring about the other’s points or priorities 
 3. Providing information (about points or interests)
 4. Asking for or providing explanation (about behavior)
Persuasive arguments
 5. Arguments referring to role instruction or context
 6. Downward comparisons 
 7. Threats and warnings 
 8. Commitment to a certain position
Offers 
 9. Offering an exchange
10. Proposing a common or specifi c offer 
11. Repeating an offer
12. Accepting an offer 
13. Rejecting an offer
Other remarks
14. Insight into and understanding of the other’s priorities
15. Cooperative statements
16. Derogations and impolite statements
17. Humor and friendly jokes
18. Social remarks
19. Remarks or suggestions on the process
20. Common remarks or questions about the role
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Results
Treatment of the data 
Data within dyads were dependent and negotiator 
role did not interact with any of the dependent 
measures. Hence we collapsed over role and 
used the dyad as the unit of analysis. Dyad 
gender had no signifi cant main or interaction 
effects (all ps > .10), so it is not reported in the 
subsequent analyses. One dyad in the advice-only 
condition, two dyads in the experience-only 
condition, and three dyads in the experience-
and-advice condition did not reach agreement 
in the fi rst negotiation. Impasse was not related 
to condition (χ2(2, N = 68) = 0.77, ns). The 
only dyad that did not reach agreement in the 
second negotiation was in the experience-only 
condition. Impasse dyads create a problem for 
data analysis: assigning impasse a score of zero 
for negotiation outcome would lead to artifi ci-
ally high variance. As recommended by Lewis 
and Fry (1977), we assigned impasse dyads the 
lowest joint outcome reached by an agreement 
dyad, namely 4400 points. (Removing im-
passe dyads from the analysis or assigning them 
the score of 5600 points would have led to the 
same pattern of results.) To test our hypotheses, 
we made a comparison between the fi rst (i.e. the 
only) negotiation in the advice-only condition, 
the second negotiation in the experience-only 
condition, and the second negotiation in the 
experience-and-advice condition.
Reception of and compliance with the advice
Participants rated the tips as useful, no matter 
whether they received them prior to their fi rst 
negotiation or prior to their second negotiation 
(M = 2.20, SD = 0.76 and M = 2.25, SD = 0.64, 
respectively; t(86) = .34, ns). In both groups, mean 
usefulness ratings were higher than the scale 
midpoint of 1.5 (t(39) = 5.82, and t(47) = 8.17, 
ps < .001). Participants who received the tips 
prior to their second negotiation indicated a 
marginally stronger intention to apply them 
than did participants who received them prior 
to their fi rst negotiation (M = 1.75, SD = 0.89 vs. 
M = 1.40, SD = 0.74; t(86) = 1.98, p = .051). 
(To assess whether participants perceived the 
advice, we compared these individual ratings 
at the individual, not the dyadic level. This was 
possible because the ratings were made before the 
dyadic interactions and thus were not dependent 
within dyads. Averaging the ratings within dyads, 
however, led to the same conclusions.) 
We also investigated whether dyads followed 
the advice to exchange information. In the 
fi rst round of negotiation, 18 out of the 20 
dyads (90.0%) in the advice-only condition 
requested or gave information in at least 
one speaking turn. This is signifi cantly more 
frequent than in the other two conditions, 
where dyads received no advice before their 
fi rst negotiation. Only 11 out of 24 (45.8%) and 
12 out of 24 (50.0%) dyads in the experience-
only and the experience-and-advice conditions 
(respectively) exchanged any information at 
all (χ2(2, N = 68) = 10.53, p < .01). In the 
second round, 23 out of 24 dyads (95.8%) in 
the experience-and-advice condition exchanged 
information, which is signifi cantly more frequent 
than the 16 out of 24 dyads (66.7%) that did so 
in the experience-only condition (χ2(1, N = 48) = 
6.70, p < .01). Obviously, almost all of the dyads 
that received advice engaged in at least some 
information exchange, whereas signifi cantly 
fewer of the dyads that did not receive advice 
did so. It thus seems safe to conclude that par-
ticipants read and understood the advice.5 
Correlations among dependent variables
Table 3 shows the correlations among the main 
dependent variables. The correlation between 
joint outcome and duration was highly negative, 
indicating that dyads reaching more profi table 
agreements needed less time to negotiate. The 
correlations also showed that higher joint out-
comes were related to more problem solving, 
less use of contentious tactics, and more accur-
ate judgments of the negotiation situation. Not 
surprisingly, judgmental accuracy was positively 
correlated with problem solving—dyads that 
used problem solving tactics (including informa-
tion exchange) had more accurate judgments 
about each other’s preferences. And judgmental 
accuracy was highly negatively correlated with 
contending. The use of such tactics as threats, 
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warnings, or positional statements was associated 
with less accurate perceptions of the bargaining 
situation. 
Effects of advice or experience
Table 4 gives the mean joint outcomes achieved 
in all rounds of the negotiation. A one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that 
joint outcomes in the fi rst negotiation were 
not infl uenced by condition (F(2, 65) < 1, ns, 
η2 = .025). The ‘baseline’ performance of the 
experience-only dyads and the experience-
and-advice dyads was about the same as the 
performance of dyads that received advice prior 
to their fi rst negotiation. This fi nding suggests 
that advice by itself was not enough to improve 
negotiation performance. 
We also examined whether dyads that 
negotiated twice achieved higher joint outcomes 
in the second negotiation. The joint outcomes of 
the experience-only and the experience-and-
advice dyads were entered in an ANOVA with 
condition and negotiation task as between-
dyads factors and round as a within-dyads 
factor. A signifi cant main effect of round (F(1, 
44) = 14.54, p < .001, η2 = .248) revealed higher 
joint outcomes in the second negotiation. This 
effect was qualifi ed by a marginally signifi cant 
interaction between round and condition 
(F(1, 44) = 3.37, p < .10, η2 = .071). Paired-sample 
t tests revealed that experience-and-advice dyads 
improved their joint outcomes signifi cantly 
over rounds (t(23) = 5.36, p < .001), whereas 
experience-only dyads did not (t(23) = 1.19, ns). 
Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the main dependent variables
 M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Joint outcome 6809 997 –   
2. Duration 8.38 4.23 –.58*** –  
3. Contending 4.09 3.30 –.55***  .65*** – 
4. Problem solving 3.84 4.04  .47*** –.60*** –.61*** –
5. Judgmental accuracy 0.58 0.43  .51*** –.36** –.49***  .43***
*** p < .001; ** p < .01 (two-tailed).
Notes: N = 68 dyads. All variables refer to the last negotiation, i.e. to the second negotiation of dyads who 
negotiated twice, and to the fi rst negotiation of dyads who negotiated once. All coeffi cients are Pearson 
correlation coeffi cients.
Table 4. Main outcome and process measures depending on experimental condition
 Experience-only Advice-only Experience and advice
 (n = 24) (n = 20) (n = 24)
First negotiation
Joint outcome 6200a (1133) 6590a (979) 6250a (1104)
Duration 10.67a (3.34) 10.30a (3.51) 10.75a (3.84)
Contending 5.96a (2.31) 4.54a (2.70) 4.93a (3.19)
Problem solving 1.63a (3.08) 3.31a (3.28) 2.13a (3.14)
Last negotiation
Joint outcome  6550a (1118) 6590a (979) 7250b (735)
Duration 9.46a (3.81) 10.30a (3.51) 5.71b (3.93)
Contending 5.72a (3.80) 4.54a (2.70) 2.07b (2.00)
Problem solving 1.63a (3.08) 3.31a (3.28) 6.48b (4.08)
Judgmental accuracy 0.43a (0.41) 0.54ab (0.41) 0.76b (0.42)
Notes: n refers to the number of dyads per condition. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. In the 
advice-only condition, ‘fi rst negotiation’ and ‘last negotiation’ refer to the same (i.e. the only) negotiation. Means 
not sharing the same subscript within a row differ at p < .05 according to a Duncan test.
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This fi nding suggests that experience by itself 
may not be enough to improve negotiation 
performance.
Effects of experience and advice
Next, the fi ve dependent variables (all refer-
ring to the last negotiation) were submitted to 
3 (condition) × 2 (task) ANOVAs. Means and 
standard deviations for the variables broken 
down by experimental condition are displayed 
in Table 4.
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, condition had 
the main effect on joint outcome (F(2, 62) = 3.91, 
p < .05, η2 = .112). A Duncan test (p < .05) showed 
that experience-and-advice dyads achieved a 
higher joint outcome than did dyads in the 
other two conditions, which did not differ sig-
nifi cantly from each other. There was no task 
main effect, nor any task by condition interaction 
effect. Condition also infl uenced negotiation 
duration (F(2, 62) = 10.48, p < .001, η2 = .253). 
A Duncan test (p < .05) showed that dyads in 
the experience-and-advice condition reached 
agreement faster than did dyads in the other 
two conditions, which did not differ signifi cantly 
from each other.6 Taken altogether, the results 
so far were in line with our expectation that 
advice combined with experience would improve 
negotiation performance. 
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that negotiators 
would engage in more problem solving in a 
second (as compared to a fi rst) negotiation, 
but only when they were given advice and cues 
about the task. ANOVA revealed the predicted 
main effect of condition on problem solving 
(F(2, 62) = 12.22, p < .001, η2 = .283). A Duncan 
test (p < .05) showed that experience-and-advice 
dyads engaged in more problem solving than 
did advice-only and experience-only dyads, 
which did not differ from each other in this 
regard. Results further revealed a signifi cant 
main effect of condition on judgmental accuracy 
(F(2, 62) = 3.91, p < .05, η2 = .112). Duncan’s test 
(p < .05) indicated that dyads in the experience-
and-advice condition had more accurate per-
ceptions of each other’s interests than did dyads 
in the experience-only condition. Dyads in the 
advice-only condition were in-between and did 
not differ from the other two conditions on this 
measure. There was no task main effect, nor any 
task by condition interaction effect. Finally, with 
regard to contending, the only signifi cant effect 
was a main effect of condition (F(2, 62) = 9.66, 
p < .001, η2 = .238). A Duncan test (p < .05) 
showed that dyads in the experience-and-advice 
condition used less contentious tactics than did 
dyads in the other two conditions, which did not 
differ signifi cantly from each other.
The negotiation behaviors displayed by dyads 
in the three conditions are illustrated in Figure 1, 
with solid bars representing contending, open 
bars representing problem solving behaviors, 
and error bars representing standard errors. 
The figure shows that: (a) experience-only 
dyads did not change their behavior from the 
fi rst to the second round of negotiation (paired-
sample t tests comparing behaviors across rounds 
of the negotiation did not indicate signifi-
cant differences for either contending t(23) = 
–0.42, ns or problem solving t(23) = 0.48, ns); 
(b) experience-and-advice dyads did change 
their behavior across rounds (less contending 
t(23) = –5.45, p < .001; more problem solving, 
t(23) = 6.67, p < .001); (c) advice did not 
signifi cantly reduce contentious behavior, in 
that advice-only dyads engaged in as much 
contending as the two unadvised groups during 
the fi rst round (t(66) = –1.74, p = .09); and 
(d) advice led to slightly more problem solving, 
in that the difference in problem solving between 
the advice-only condition and the other two 
conditions during the fi rst round of negotiations 
was marginally significant (t(62.72) = 1.86, 
p = .07).
Mediation analysis 
To assess whether problem solving, contending, 
or judgmental accuracy mediated the infl uence 
of the experimental manipulations on joint 
outcome, we performed three sets of regression 
analyses as proposed by Cohen et al. (2003). 
The fi rst analysis in each set was always the 
same—we regressed the dependent variable 
( joint outcomes) on the independent vari-
able (experimental condition). The three levels 
of experimental condition were coded into two 
dummy variables. Dummy 1 was assigned a value 
of 1 for the experience-and-advice condition 
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and 0 for the other two conditions. Dummy 2 
was assigned a value of 1 for the experience-only 
condition and 0 for the other two conditions. 
Dummy 1, but not Dummy 2, proved to be a 
signifi cant predictor of joint outcomes (β = .32, 
p < .05). The second analysis in each set was to 
regress one of the potential mediators onto the 
independent variable. Finally, the third analysis 
in each set was to regress joint outcomes onto one 
of the mediators and the independent variable, to 
see if the regression weight for the independent 
variable became weaker as a result. 
In the fi rst set of regression analyses, we inves-
tigated whether the effect of condition on joint 
outcomes was mediated by problem solving 
behavior. As noted above, the first analysis 
showed that condition had a signifi cant effect 
on joint outcomes. The second analysis showed 
that condition also had a signifi cant effect on 
the mediator, problem solving behavior (β = .38, 
p < .01). Finally, the third analysis showed that 
when condition and problem solving behavior 
were both used to predict joint outcome, the 
mediator had a signifi cant effect on the depend-
ent variable (β = .42, p < .01), whereas the 
initially signifi cant effect of condition became 
nonsignifi cant (β = .16, ns). A Sobel test revealed 
that this reduction was statistically signifi cant 
(Z = 2.17, p < .05). These results showed that 
the effect of condition on joint outcomes was 
mediated by problem solving behavior.
In the second set of regression analyses, we 
investigated whether contending mediated 
the effect of condition on joint outcomes. The 
fi rst analysis (again) showed that condition 
had a signifi cant effect on joint outcomes. The 
second analysis showed that condition also had 
a signifi cant effect on the mediator, contend-
ing behavior (β = –.35, p < .01). Finally, the 
third analysis showed that when condition and 
contending behavior were both used to predict 
joint outcomes, the mediator had a signifi cant 
effect on the dependent variable (β = –.52, 
p < .001), whereas the initially signifi cant effect 
of condition became nonsignifi cant (β = .13, ns). 
A Sobel test revealed that this reduction was 
statistically signifi cant (Z = 2.35, p < .02). These 
results show that the effect of condition on joint 
outcomes was mediated by contending.
In the third set of regression analyses, we inves-
tigated whether the effect of condition on joint 
outcome was mediated by judgmental accuracy. 
Again, the fi rst analysis showed that condition 
had a signifi cant effect on joint outcomes. The 
second analysis showed that condition had a 
marginally signifi cant effect on judgmental 
accuracy (β = .25, p = .08). Nevertheless, the 
initially signifi cant effect of condition became 
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Figure 1. Negotiation strategies (+ SE) depending on negotiation round and experimental condition. Solid bars 
represent contending, open bars represent problem solving.
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nonsignifi cant (β = .20, ns), when both condition 
and judgmental accuracy (β = .46, p < .001) were 
used to predict joint outcomes. A Sobel test 
revealed that this reduction was marginally sig-
nifi cant (Z = 1.65, p < .10). These results point to 
the mediating role of judgmental accuracy.7
All in all, these analyses showed that, compared 
to unadvised dyads with negotiation experience, 
or to advised but inexperienced dyads, dyads 
with experience and advice reached higher 
joint outcomes through the use of more prob-
lem solving and less contentious behaviors 
and through greater insight into each other’s 
preferences.
Discussion
Our research investigated whether people learn 
to become better negotiators through experi-
ence, through advice, or through a combination 
of the two. The fi ndings showed that neither 
advice nor experience alone leads to more 
integrative negotiation. The combination of 
the two, however, strongly affected problem-
solving behavior, judgmental accuracy, and 
joint outcomes. 
Dyads that simply engaged in two successive 
negotiations did not reach a signifi cantly higher 
outcome in the second round. This replicates 
the fi ndings of Thompson and DeHarpport 
(1994), who found no increase in joint out-
comes over time for a control group of bargainers 
that negotiated four rounds without receiving 
feedback, and the fi ndings of Nadler et al. (2003), 
who concluded that ‘simply having experience ... 
is largely ineffective’ (p. 537). We went beyond 
this earlier research, however, by examining the 
negotiation behavior of participants and found 
that experience alone did not make dyads behave 
differently. Experience-only dyads continued to 
use only contentious strategies, and did not raise 
their (low) levels of problem solving.
Like experience without advice, advice 
without experience was not enough to change 
negotiation behaviors or performance either. 
In the fi rst negotiation, dyads that were advised 
to exchange information did not reach a more 
integrative agreement than dyads that did not 
receive advice. Most dyads did, in fact, follow 
the advice to exchange information. Yet this led 
to only slightly more problem solving behavior, 
perhaps because few dyads exchanged more 
than a minimal amount of information. No 
major shift toward a cooperative, problem solv-
ing style of negotiation occurred. The amount 
of contentious behavior was the same as in the 
unadvised dyads. 
The negotiations of experienced and advised 
dyads were the most interesting. These dyads 
settled on more integrative outcomes, because 
they engaged in more problem solving behavior 
and avoided contentious behavior. After a 
disappointing fi rst round of negotiation, these 
dyads used the advice to overcome fi xed-pie 
perceptions. Advice was thus effective in im-
proving negotiation performance when given 
to experienced dyads, but not when given to 
inexperienced dyads. 
Why did experienced dyads use the advice to 
negotiate more cooperatively and reach more 
integrative agreements, when inexperienced 
dyads did not? One possible explanation is 
that advice cannot be comprehended when 
people have no actual experience with a task. 
This explanation, however, seems unlikely—the 
advice we gave was deliberately brief and easy to 
understand. Furthermore, process data suggests 
that participants understood the advice. Dyads 
did exchange information when they were 
advised to do so.
Another explanation is that people are more 
motivated to listen to advice after they attempt 
to perform a task, but fail. This explanation is 
in line with research by Smith-Jentsch, Jentsch, 
Payne, and Salas (1996), which suggests that 
the experience of failure makes people more 
receptive to new ideas and increases self-analysis, 
which leads to better retention of skills and 
thereby facilitates learning. Our measure of 
the participants’ motivation to use the advice 
we gave them favors a motivational explanation 
as well, because people who received the advice 
after the fi rst round of negotiation reported a 
greater intention to use it than did those who 
received the advice before the fi rst round of 
negotiation. However, we assessed participants’ 
motivation with just one item, so the results are 
tentative rather than conclusive. 
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Our motivational explanation does not con-
tradict earlier studies that did fi nd effects of 
advice (e.g. Kemp & Smith, 1994; Nadler et al., 
2003; Weingart et al., 1996). Those studies used 
more elaborate advice, some parts of which may 
have strengthened participants’ motivation to 
use the advice, or which may have been inter-
preted by participants as a suggestion to equate 
outcomes. 
Limitations 
We used different scenarios to make our par-
ticipants assume a new role and talk about a new 
topic in the second negotiation. Furthermore, 
the payoff schedules differed with respect to 
the location of the highest priority issue. These 
variations in the negotiation task guaranteed 
that bargainers could not simply repeat an 
agreement that was successful before. Yet the 
tasks were structurally similar because logrolling 
was the key to success in both scenarios. This 
made learning possible—dyads that found out 
how to make mutually benefi cial concessions in 
the fi rst negotiation could apply this knowledge 
in the second negotiation. It is beyond the 
scope of this experiment to determine whether 
the effects of experience and advice are similar 
when tasks differ more. 
We deliberately chose to explore the single 
and combined effects of very brief advice and 
rather minimal experience. Our advice consisted 
of just three sentences, and experience was oper-
ationalized by having dyads engage in just two 
similar negotiations. Both operationalizations 
differ from ‘real life’, where advice sometimes 
consists of advanced teaching programs and 
experience encompasses a larger track record. 
This jeopardizes the external validity of our 
fi ndings, but our goal was theory testing rather 
than providing advice to people who train 
negotiators or conduct negotiations in real-
world settings. In principle, however, we see 
no reason why our findings and the basic 
principles uncovered in our research should not 
generalize to real-world settings or be used to 
inform training efforts. The advice we used 
stressed two key aspects of integrative nego-
tiation, namely focusing on joint benefi ts and 
exchanging priority information. These are key 
to success in any negotiation with logrolling 
potential. Our advice might have weaker effects 
in negotiation situations that involve other ways 
to improve outcomes (e.g. cost-cutting, bridging, 
adding issues, or implementing contingency 
contracts). However, we are still confi dent that 
it is the combination of experience and advice 
that leads to improved negotiation outcomes, 
because this combination changed the entire 
pattern of negotiation behavior, rather than just 
stimulating logrolling behavior.
Experience was operationalized in a simple 
way as well. Dyads negotiated twice, and in 
between the two rounds, they either received 
advice or engaged in a short fi ller task. We 
selected a fi ller task that was content-free (at 
least compared to the negotiation scenarios), 
in the hope that it would not interfere with the 
transfer of knowledge from one negotiation to 
the other. We cannot exclude the possibility that 
interference occurred, however. 
Implications and recommendations for future 
research
Learning from experience might require re-
fl ection. The fi ller task, however, left little time 
for refl ection. Participants might have learned 
more from their prior experience if they had 
been given more time. Nevertheless, we do 
not think that this had much impact on our 
results—after all, participants in the experience-
and-advice condition did not have much time 
either. Future research might investigate whether 
experience has differential value depending on 
the time available for refl ection.
Our results involved the immediate effects of 
advice and experience. Obviously, training could 
change behavior for a much longer period of 
time than the training session itself. The long-
term effects of experience and advice are thus 
an important topic for future research. 
What would happen if people were given 
the advice fi rst and then gained experience 
afterwards? We think that people are more 
strongly motivated to follow advice after they 
have gained experience, so a combination of 
advice and experience (in that order) would 
be less helpful, unless (of course) the advice 
were repeated or remembered before the 
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second negotiation. However, our experimental 
design did not include an advice-and-experience 
condition. This might be worth investigating in 
future research. 
Interestingly, the combination of experience 
and advice led to negotiation outcomes that 
were not only better, but also achieved in shorter 
time. This suggests that contentious tactics, 
such as pressuring an opponent or haggling, are 
ineffi cient, time-consuming activities. Because 
competitive behavior in our study was related to 
inaccurate perceptions of the negotiation situ-
ation, this fi nding also corroborates Thompson’s 
(1990) conclusion that biases are associated with 
ineffi cient performance. Another explanation 
could be that the willingness of participants to 
settle the deal and secure their earnings is in-
creased when their opponents made offers that 
yield more profi t for the participants than a 
compromise would have yielded. Future research 
could investigate how the discovery of mutually 
benefi cial agreements motivates bargainers to 
make a deal quickly. 
Both our manipulations may have infl uenced 
the negotiators’ goal setting. The fact that 
experience-only dyads were contentious during 
both negotiations is akin to something reported 
in an early negotiation experiment. In a classroom 
study of repeated bargaining behavior, Kelley 
(1966) found that experience with bargaining 
increased students’ aspirations, which in turn 
became manifest in higher fi rst offers. Similarly, 
experience with the task in our experiment may 
have increased negotiator’s aspirations, which led 
them to engage in contentious behavior, except 
when they also received advice. The advice we 
gave them was also directed at infl uencing par-
ticipants’ goal-setting, because they were told to 
focus on the best outcome for both negotiators. 
In a recent meta-analysis, Zetik and Stuhlmacher 
(2002) showed that goals have more effect on 
negotiation performance when a negotiator 
has experience with a task. However, we did not 
measure the negotiators’ goals in the present 
study. Investigating how training and experience 
infl uence negotiation behavior and performance 
through goal-setting is defi nitively an endeavor 
for future research. 
In conclusion, this study adds to our knowledge 
by investigating not only negotiation outcomes, 
but also the behavioral processes and cognitive deter-
minants related to the effects of experience and 
advice. We did not set out to explore the under-
lying motivational aspects of negotiation behavior. 
We suggested that bargainers use tactical advice 
only after experiencing a disappointing fi rst 
negotiation. Future work could address this issue 
in more detail by exploring the cognitive and 
motivational processes triggered by experience, 
advice, and their combination.
Looking at our results from a practical point 
of view, it is interesting that a very simple piece 
of advice can be enough to signifi cantly im-
prove negotiation effectiveness and effi ciency. 
Bargainers, however, need some practical experi-
ence to be able to profi t from such advice. Com-
bined with practical experience, a short training 
session, which might be easy to implement, could 
improve negotiators’ performance and help 
them and their organizations move forward.
Notes
1. In the fi rst round, 56 dyads fi nished before the 
last minute was announced and another 6 dyads 
reached an agreement within the last minute. 
In the second round, 1 dyad did not fi nish 
before the last minute was announced. The 
other 47 dyads reached agreement in less than 
14 minutes. All of this suggests that dyads had 
suffi cient time to reach agreement.
2. Comparing these notes with the audiotapes 
showed that all participants wrote down the 
agreement correctly, and computed the correct 
number of points.
3. We report percentage agreement between the 
raters instead of Cohen’s Kappa, because the 
codes in our coding system are not mutually 
exclusive categories. Percentage agreement does 
not correct for chance agreement. The high 
agreement on all codes, however, suggests that 
our coding did not suffer from coincidental 
agreement. The raters agreed in 81.3% to 100% 
of their codes, depending on the category. This 
shows that agreement was high in all coded 
categories.
4. Five more factors had eigenvalues slightly larger 
than 1.00. However, we will not discuss those 
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further, because the scree plot clearly had an 
elbow at two components, and because the 
pattern of factor loadings on the remaining fi ve 
components did not correspond to traditional 
descriptions of negotiation strategies. These 
weaker, uninterpretable factors might be a 
result of the exploratory nature of this principal 
component analysis, taking into consideration 
the large number of variables and the small 
number of observations.
5. More direct evidence of whether the advice was 
read and understood could have been obtained 
by asking participants to summarize or explain 
the advice they were given. We decided not to do 
so, to prevent dyads from discussing the advice 
prior to the negotiation, which might have led 
them to create and commit themselves to new 
behavioral norms.
6. There was also a main effect of task on 
negotiation duration (F(1, 56) = 5.19, p < .05, 
η2 = .077), indicating that participants 
negotiated longer about the castle sale 
(M = 9.35 min, SD = 4.15) than about the salary 
contract (M = 7.41 min, SD = 4.13). Because task 
had no effect on the other dependent variables, 
we are confi dent that our fi ndings are not 
dependent on which confl ict setting participants 
were given.
7. In a fourth analysis, we investigated the joint 
infl uence of all three mediators at once. Joint 
outcomes were thus regressed onto condition, 
contending, problem solving, and judgmental 
accuracy. In this analysis, the effect of condition 
become nonsignifi cant (β = .08, ns), whereas 
signifi cant effects emerged for contending 
(β = –.32, p < .05), and judgmental accuracy, 
(β = .29, p < .05). This analysis is exploratory 
rather than conclusive, because the relative 
sizes of regression weights in multiple 
regression depend on several factors, including 
measurement issues such as reliability. 
Nevertheless, the results show further evidence 
that the effects of experience and advice 
on negotiation outcomes are mediated by 
both behavioral (contending) and cognitive 
( judgmental accuracy) factors. 
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